As I attempt to take NLHE more seriously and actually read up on strategy, post in the 2+2 forums, and basically start all over again at the lowest online levels, I find that I am forced to take a long look at myself not only as a poker player, but as a person. I have described in past blogs, that I tiled very easily when playing poker. That has improved over the years, but not as much as I would like due to the fact that I approached losing sessions as an indictment of my overall ability which is a ridiculous thing to do. I would go from bubble to bubble of tilt, so to speak rather than really making a concerted effort to change my way of thinking so that I wouldn't allow this to happen. It was obviously challenging to do so when running bad, playing bad, losing money, or all of the above.
I believe that I mentioned a few posts back that I have been "gambooling" a bit more when I go to a nearby casino that doesn't have a poker room. I've been playing the $10 slots and winning, luckily. This was my attempt at an exercise in learning not to care about losing money. I would limit myself to the amount I could play or lose and although I wanted to win, the point was to let go of being afraid to lose money. Now this was just one small step in trying to change my outlook on poker and there isn't much strategy in playing a slot machine. It was a very basic step in disassociating myself from playing scared. There were times when I lost $400, to $500 in a matter of 10 minutes. Luckily I won a bunch of money which allowed me to continue playing slots as well as take that money and play poker at my local casino.
The one problem with not caring about the amount of money is the slippery slope of playing well. In poker, the basic bottom line is to win money. I don't want to go to the opposite extreme and just play wild because I have no value for money (which has not happened). I began focusing on NL4 online, which is basically playing the smallest stakes on CAKE poker. $4 is the maximum buy in to start with, and the big blind is .04 cents. As I have stated in past posts, I have played NLHE before and even won some money in a tournament soon after Black Friday, but I have quite a bit of work to do, not only to get the fundamentals of the game in to my brain, but to then catch up to where the above average player is. The last part is going to be the big challenge. given the fact the I don't have as much free time to spend studying and playing poker. So far I winner at NL4 since I made an effort to play better and learn, but recently have had some tough hands that cost me 4 buy ins. Combined with a 2 buy in loss at the live tables last week, my focus of not valuing money at the poker table has been faced with some resistance. 2-3 years ago, I would have had some major blowups and tilting behavior, but this time around, I had less of a blow up or tilting behavior. I still tilted a little, but nothing like before. I consciously told myself that I needed to focus on making good decisions and not looking at the win or loss. It worked for a while, but I still allowed my emotions to get the best of me at times.
One thing I am doing this week is to take more time to post in the poker forums so that I can keep my mind on making good decisions and learning about common situations that will arise. If I just try plugging on and playing poker, I may not learn the fundamentals as well as I would like. The other thing that is more of a long term challenge for me is to not look at my results when playing online. I have the auto rebuy set and keep the HUD display over my stack. There are times, that I have to check how much I have in a hand, but that won't give me a clear idea of where I am at win/loss wise. Beginning in September I am going to make an effort not to look where my bankroll is at so that I can just focus on making good decisions in each hand. I don''t expect to be completely successful, but you have to start somewhere.
It has been a while since I have given anything resembling a update for my online poker challenge. Right after Black Friday, I decided to cash in some gold cards on Cake poker, which at that time was one of the few online poker sites that US players could use for real money games, and grind my bankroll up Ala Chris Ferguson style. I didn't plan on following all of his rules, but it would be an interesting test, given the fact that any winnings would be gravy and online poker legislation was not going to be happening anytime soon. Things were rocky at first, especially as I dove in to NLHE, but by the end of the year I had stopped playing poker as much as I would have liked. I didn't feel serious about keeping my game up and being a stay at home dad was becoming more and more challenging itself as my 3 sons were all toddlers.
I still was playing poker on CAKE from time to time, but it was at the lowest stakes and I was basically maintaining my $50ish bankroll by earning rakeback for the amount I lost, which came mostly at LAGGy NLHE play. In the middle of the summer, I decided to start rereading Ed Miller's NLHE book, No Limit: Theory & Practice as well as looking at the NLHE forums in 2+2. Once I began to refocus my game, things immediately got better with respect to my winnings.
Since July 12th, I have won around 12 buy ins at NL4 (which is $4 max-100 BBs) over the course of 4,000ish hands. I plan on moving up to NL10 when my bankroll hits $250. I am currently at $150ish in my bankroll and would like to see where my win rate is after 10,000 more hands. Hopefully I came have some more leaks plugged over the next 2 months so that I won't get fleeced when I go out to Las Vegas in late October. On a side note: I have been playing a good deal of slots at the local casinos as a way to let go of my fear on losing money and slots are a good way to lose money. The only problem is that I am winning a lot more than I am losing. I won $700 earlier in the summer, another $300 in July, and then hit a jackpot of $1,400 a week ago. The trick is to play the $10 slots rather than the .25. You will lose more, but when you win, ho ho ho ho....when you WIN!!!
Here is the 3rd rough drat installment of my financial crisis/online poker piece. Obviously I have yet to get in to the online poker part. just as a reminder, this is a rough draft that needs corrections. Thank you for any feedback.
The Savings and Loan crisis of the mid 80's was a fresh wound when the calls for deregulation started up again. Like previous financial crashes, the S&L debacle could have been a reminder that unrestricted behavior on the part of banks without supervision will most likely cause financial destruction on some level, but because the cleanup was done in an efficient manner compared to those catastrophes before, opponents of regulation could point to the inexperience of smaller institutions and their risky behavior that put them closer to the inevitable tipping point of insolvency. Large Wall Street S&Ls took financial hits as a result of the crisis, but came out on top having rid themselves of regional competition. This gave them clear site of a new target in the global financial sector and they had a relatively new weapon at their disposal in the form of the growing derivatives market. The $160 billion bailout of the S&L industry did little to slowdown the money churning lobbying effort of the large banks to seek further deregulation and in 1987 they had a new hero. On June 2nd, 1987, then President, Ronald Reagan nominated Alan Greenspan as the next Chairman of the Federal Reserve. Alan Greenspan was a staunch advocate of deregulation and was in favor of letting the market take care of itself, while his predecessor, Paul Volcker was against allowing barriers to be torn down that would allow large banks to become even larger.
The Treasury Department at that time, like Greenspan, was in favor of allowing banks to get bigger in order to better compete with financial institutions around the world, namely Europe and Japan. George D. Gould, Under Secretary of the Treasury, was reported in the New York Times as saying,
''If we are going to be competitive in a globalized financial-services world, we are going to have to change our views on the size of American institutions,'' Mr. Gould said. ''People are going to have to accept that some big American financial institutions will need more capital to be competitive.''
Those who sought out less restriction believed that as the financial products became more complicated, the competition for capital investments became unbalanced due to the lack of regulation in foreign markets. The United States no longer had the largest banks in the world which was what many on Wall Street were looking to regain. Gould cited more lenient restrictions on the part of foreign banks in areas of capital to asset ratio as well as their ability to offer a wider variety of underwriting services to go with the everyday banking that had put them ahead of their American counterparts. Asian countries were experiencing a higher than normal growth rate and Japan was in the midst of their own bubble with rising home prices, low interest rates, and easily obtained credit.
Hans Angermueller, vice chairman of Citicorp said, ''We have been the beneficiaries of living in a relatively insulated big economy, and only recently have we found out that the Japanese can make automobiles better than we do, We are discovering that the same thing may apply in the financial services area, and to meet that challenge, we need to get leaner, meaner and stronger. We don't do this by preserving the heartwarming idea that 14,000 banks are wonderful for our country.'' Greenspan is later reported as saying that given the current banking environment, ''I do not have a fear of undue concentration of banking powers.''
The Congressional Research Service released a report in June of that year on the subject of commercial banks vs. investment banks, in which they reiterate the reasons for supporting Glass-Steagall, citing "...the distinctions between loans, securities, and deposits are not well drawn." Banks that would be able to issue securities and take deposits are in nature at odds within those activities. Securities have a larger risk associated with them and institutions that take deposits are intended to minimize risk. The report acknowledged how American banks were losing market share to their deregulated foreign competitors and it advocated for legislation that wold reduce the "conflicts of interest". "The securities activities that depository institutions are seeking are both low-risk by their very nature, and would reduce the total risk of organizations offering them by diversification."
Later that summer, Congressmen, Charles Schumer wrote an Opinion piece in the New York Times speaking out against repealing Glass-Steagall and the possible negative effects of large Wall Street banks. Schumer responded explained that in his opinion, Japanese banks had grown because of a similar regulatory protection from outside competition. Schumer also cited the fact that American banks had seen more profit in the mid 80's than that of the their large foreign competitors and warned of the classic risky behavior in financial markets.
"The banks’ proposals also defy common sense. Given the chance to speculate, some institutions are going to gamble poorly. This in turn will undermine confidence in the whole banking system. The recent experience of the thrift industry reinforces this lesson." Schumer goes on to say, "A bailout of the much larger commercial banking sector, if it got into a similar problem, would make the recapitalization for thrifts seem insignificant...Today's bankers promise they will be more careful. But to accept their assurances runs counter to the simple principles of fairness and common sense."
It seems that Schumer, who was an advocate for the Garn-St. Germain Act of 1982, had a bit of a turnaround in light of the rampant fraud and gambling of the Savings and Loan crisis.
In mid October 1987, called Black Monday, global financial markets plummeted, starting in Hong Kong and quickly working west like a financial Tsunami through Europe and then the United States. There are many causes that have been cited for the sudden drop, with Program Trading being one of the most popular, in which computers conduct rapid executions of strategies based on inputs. Proponents of this explanation state that once the crash started, those who were holding portfolio insurance derivatives were forced to sell with each down tick movement, hauntingly reminiscent of the stock market crash of 1929.
Economist David Mullins was asked to head the Brady commission for the purpose of investigating the causes of Black Monday. The conclusion directed a great deal of blame on derivative traders and portfolio insurance. 2 years later Mullins was nominated to fill a vacancy for the Federal Reserve board of Governors under George W. Bush until he left to be a part of John Meriwether's hedge fund, Long Term Capital Management. Others attribute the cause to global monetary policies as well as the collapse of the US-European bond markets that had a ripple effect in other areas of the Global financial sector. The Dow Jones fell 508 points (22.61%) which became the largest one day percentage drop since 1916. By the end of the month world markets had fallen from 22% up to, in some cases, 45%. The DJIA did not reach its high of 1987 for another 2 years.
Despite the tremor in the vastly intertwined global financial markets, Alan Greenspan continued to voice his opinion that Glass-Steagall should be repealed. "Warning that banks will become the dinosaurs of financial services if the Depression-era law is not repealed, Greenspan said that the Fed believes banking can be tied to securities underwriting without subjecting federally insured deposits at banks to the risks inherent in the stock market." "The risks can never be fully eliminated, but they can be sufficiently contained to be acceptable," Greenspan said. In February 1988, the GAO released a statement, summarized by Charles Bowsher (Comptroller General of the US) answering the concerns raised by Congressmen Edward Markey, as to the possible outcomes with the repeal of Glass-Steagall. In the view of the GAO, the integration of the banking and security shows how the Glass-Steagall Act may be antiquated, yet the nature of financial innovation may not be entirely stable. It's "...potentially dangerous because it has not allowed for the systematic consideration for the legal and regulatory structure needed to better reflect the realities of today's financial marketplace."
The statement summarizes the supporting legislation needed in the opinion of the GAO in order to preserve the safety and soundness of the banking system as well as protecting the consumer’s interest. Maintaining an adequate level of capital reserves in order to cushion against losses and keeping the bank holding structure in order to preserve liquidity are the classic problems in most cases of financial downturn. The GAO raises the question of how far should the Federal Reserve go in times of financial crisis. The report goes on to state that "Ultimately, the degree of comfort that one has with the repeal of Glass-Steagall depends on one's faith in the regulators' abilities to effectively oversee the newly allowed activities..." This report reflects the concerns of a changing financial sector that, like technology, was growing no matter the obstacle. The underlying concern raised was how new legislation would better support and protect the changes of a diverse market place. The GAO warned of the possible confusion and complexities of a cutting edge investment area that could end in a crash much similar to 1929 despite its technological leaps. What many knew, unwilling to admit was that for all the changes the world had seen, ultimately human desire for riches may be it's undoing.
This is the 2nd post of my grand financial/online poker opus. I used the Stock Market crash of 1929 as a bit of a prelude to the modern lead up to the 2008 Financial Crisis, which in the opinion of many renowned economists and journalists, started in 1979. Thanks for reading.
With the passing of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1932/33, banks were separated into 2 areas, commercial and investment. Not only did this cut down the size of the banks in the late 1920's, but the potential economic damage that could be caused by a widespread contagion. Banks no longer were able to use customer deposits in the same way as before, which was viewed as reckless gambling. The separation also helped to cut back on the conflicts of interest by banks that profited by customer loss. The act also created the Federal deposit insurance corporation, otherwise known as the FDIC. It insured customer deposits in Federally approved banks up to a specific amount, which could potentially assuage fears in times of financial crisis, as in the late 20's and early 30's. Another important provision in the Glass-Steagall Act was Regulation Q, which stopped the practice of interest bearing checking accounts on customer deposits which supported aggressive competition amongst banks to attract more capital during the 1920s, termed "the race to the bottom". Regulation Q also limited the amount of risk that a bank could put it self in and encouraged investment in substitute areas like money market accounts and other banking alternatives which supported competition. At the end of the day, the Glass-Steagall act was put into place in order to stop systematic risk while protecting consumers. Another important event was the construction of the Federal Savings and Loan insurance corporation which was created as a part of the National Housing Act of 1934. It's intention was the same as the FDIC with respect to insuring deposits in Savings & Loans companies as well as stopping the failures of financial institutions across the country.
This brings us to the mid 1970's when the Savings and Loan industry was facing the first of 2 major challenges. The S&L industry was having a difficult time competing for capital in a slow growth economy facing high inflation. Depositors were taking their money out of Savings and Loan companies and putting them into market accounts which earned more in times of high interest rates. The second hurdle the lack of customers given the fact potential home owners had a harder time qualifying for a mortgage which meant less customers for the S&Ls. In 1979, the Federal Reserve raised interest rates again as a tool to curb inflation which put S&Ls at a breaking point.
In 1980, congress passed the first of 2 major acts of deregulation in order to help financial institutions especially the hurting Savings and Loan industry. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act removed the power of setting interest rates by the Federal Reserve and allowed financial institutions the ability to charge any interest rate they chose. It also gave banks the ability to merge and S&Ls could offer checkable deposits. The Savings & Loan industry was now able to compete on what at first appeared to be a more even basis for customer deposits than before and with the additional deregulation the S&Ls could use that capital from mortgages sold in to the secondary market to reinvest in order to seek better returns. The S&Ls commonly sold those mortgages to larger Wall Street banks that not only paid lower than face value for them, but re bundled the mortgages into a pool and resold them to the S&L industry as government backed bonds charging high fees. Another way the larger banks were ahead of the curve in light of the deregulation of 1980 was the fact that they had the liquidity to offer higher interest rates to their customers which in turn attracted investors to their stock.
According to a study published in the "Journal of Finance", entitled, An examination of the impact of Garn-St. Germain Depository institutions Act of 1982 on Commerical banks and Savings and loans, "...present evidence that the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 provided a wealth transfer from non-Federal Reserve System member banks and Savings and Loans (S&Ls) to Federal Reserve Member Banks. Furthermore, Cornett and Tehranian (1989) find that the banking deregulation passed in 1980 benefited stockholders of large banks and savings and loans but produced negative abnormal stock returns for small banks and savings and loans."
S&Ls were forced to compete by offering higher than normal interest rates compared to the assets in their portfolios which caused them to be insolvent. By 1980 many of the already distressed institutions were failing. This raised strong concerns in Congress that if S&Ls were facing these desperate conditions, then the entire financial system could be at risk if a large percentage of Savings and Loan industry went under.
"The changes in the economic and financial conditions resulted in a demand for further reform of the financial system, and eventually, the passage of the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982." (pg.3)
The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act was intended to give further support to the housing industries on both the lender's side and borrower's side. According to William K. Black, the Act was based on legislation first put forth in Texas, which at the time was one of the most profitable states with respect to their Savings and Loan industry. It deregulated many areas of Commercial loans by expanding the areas of lending and home loans by financial institutions. They could now offer a wider array of mortgages with less restrictions on who they could sell them to. S&Ls could now lend at a higher ratio compared to the capital they had. The Act also allowed more lenient accounting rules with which they would report their financial stability which made them appear to be more profitable. They were allowed to increase the percentage of commercial and consumer loans within their portfolios led to an unbalanced business acumen that would later prove costly. They were also allowed to invest, for the first time, in state and local government revenue bonds.
These areas of deregulation were meant to make the market more fair and balance, especially for the smaller financial institutions like small S&Ls the ability to compete with larger banks as well as non-regulated entities, like money market funds and brokerage houses, but in reality, it gave the large banks pathways to capital that regulation hadn't allowed before. This perpetuated the inequality in competition which put pressure on the S&L industry to take on more risky investments and "sell short" in a long term market. This act, in effect, created a "race to the bottom" with respect to deregulation by the Federal government and the State governments in order to compete for S&L charters. It was easy for financial institutions to switch between being a Federal Charter or a State Charter while being backed by the FDIC. The attraction was what the institutions would be allowed to invest in under a given charter. The S&Ls naturally went where there was the least amount of regulation and oversight. As a result, the S&Ls grew at an enormous rate and were able to leverage their risk more so than ever before without having to back up their loans with capital.
The icing on the cake was that there was little to no oversight, especially in States like California and Texas where the loan default rates were higher than average. The Savings and Loan industry was experiencing a housing boom in the mid 80's in the light of deregulation. Smaller S&Ls that were once insolvent were now climbing their way out of failure and looking forward to successful endeavors, until 1986. The Reagan administration continued its policy of tax cuts with the passing of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 which may have been the final straw in breaking the back of the Savings and loan industry as well as popping the housing boom of the mid 1980's. One of the provisions in the Tax Reform Act was to remove tax shelters in the area of passive real estate investment, both in housing as well as commercial investments. This helped to cause a decline in housing prices which forced investors to sell which then compounded the problem by lowering prices even more. As prices fell, investors defaulted, and the institutions holding the mortgages in portfolio, especially small S&Ls, were forced to sell those mortgages which caused housing prices to fall even more.
As the dominoes fell in one institution, so did others on down the line, much like 1929. Home owners defaulted at a high rate, smaller financial groups like S&Ls quickly became insolvent, and bond holders who were not insured lost their savings. By the late 1980's the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation itself was insolvent due to the number of S&L bankruptcies which numbered in the thousands. Tax payers, many of whom had never used a Savings and Loan were paying the cost of this debacle which was estimated at $160.1 billion. That amount was not including Federally insured S&L losses before 1986 or after 1996. As it was in the financial crashes of 1893, 1907, and 1929, capital had to be injected in order to stop a systematic crash that could have very well shut down the entire U.S. economy which in turn could cause a world wide contagion.
In hindsight, the Savings and Loan crisis of the mid to late 80's appears to be one that was manufactured out of ignorance, ego, and recklessness. Government on both sides of the aisle believed that the Financial sector would act in the best interests of home owners, investors, and their own institutions by being responsible and regulating themselves. They were wrong.
Due to the fact that I have very little time to work on the extended blog post that I had been talking about dealing with government's policies towards the financial sector and online poker, I though that it would be a good idea to post some of the sections that I have finished in hopes of getting some feedback in any way shape or form. I have not listed the sources that I have used or quoted, so please give me some slack. There are a lot of links to list and this is just some rough pages, if you will. Thanks for your understanding.
The Stock Market Crash of 1929
The 1920's were a time of innovation, speculation, and mass consumption driven by a boom in the areas of investment and production. Soldiers returning from World War I were looking for jobs and had money to spend. Initially after the war here was a short, but deep recession as demand had been slowed to a near standstill. Innovation of products was an important channel to kick start the economy. Factories that had once been focused on wartime production, were soon churning out products for a population returning to normalcy. This boom was also supported heavily by 3 consecutive Republican Presidents, Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover. Harding's strong belief in lower taxes, reducing the debt, and a economic philosophy of laissez-faire markets, would be the impetus for the golden twenties in which Calvin Coolidge would take credit and Hoover would have to deal with.
The supply side road to economic recovery ushered in a time of mass consumption of products once a luxury like the automobile, radio, air conditioning, home electricity and Hollywood movies. Another side of innovation came in the form of financial investments. New products were in high demand and companies needed capital to supply their growing customer base. The stock market, which was once for large commercial businesses, soon became a game for the masses. Everyone wanted their chance at making a fortune which after all was the American dream.
Many on those in business and finance saw this as a way to increase their own fortunes. Charles E. Mitchell, president of National City Bank (now Citibank), and president of National City Company, which became the largest security issuing entity in the world, saw an opportunity in the everyman. His salesmen started to target individuals as investors and advanced millions to his sales team for speculation. The 1920's were marked by a cosmopolitan sensibility that helped to instill the idea of upward mobility. Unfortunately for the masses, there was an increasing disparity of wealth. The wealthiest 5% Americans were making over 33% of the income. How was the average person able to get in to the market and amass their own fortune? Credit.
One of the new slogans of the decade became, "Buy now, pay later".
Everyday people were getting in on the stock market craze based on margin buying. At the time, the market had seen a six year rise that appeared to have no end in sight in early 1929. The great American economist, Irving Fisher proclaimed that "Stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau."
In March of 1929, soon after Herbert Hoover's inauguration, there was a growing unrest on the part of investors over the fact that the stock market was largely dependent on borrowed money. By August of that year, brokers would regularly be lending more than 2/3rds the face value of the stock being purchased. More than $8.5 billion was out on loan which was more than currency in circulation. The Federal Reserve debated asking for regulation of the stock market and the practice of buying on margin, but ultimately stayed silent. Monday, March 25th saw a large sell off of blue chip stocks which continued on Tuesday. A small panic had begun on the part of investors. Those who had bought on margin, usually only 10%, were hit very hard and could not cover their stocks. Brokers sold off those stocks which caused the market to fall even more. As prices dropped more margin calls were triggered and so the dominoes began to fall. Credit became increasingly difficult to find as interest rates quickly went up to 20%. Banker, Charles E. Mitchell, worried about the whole system, as well as his own fortune, stepped in and through National City bank provided $25 million in credit to bring relief for margin calls. This capital injection helped to stop the bleeding and possible collapse in March of 1929.
In the following months the stock market continued to climb even though the economy had begun to slowdown. Steel production declined, the construction industry slowed, and the demand for automobiles fell sharply, yet the phenomenon of speculation pushed stock market prices higher. Borrowing soared to record heights as some blue chip stocks increased by 50% that summer.
In early fall of that year, Congress debated the Smoot-Hawley tariff bill which would increase tariffs on agricultural and industrial goods in the effort to protect farmers and American jobs from foreign competition. It was also seen as having strong negative effects from an international standpoint which are some of the reasons why it has been cited as a cause for the overall instability by investors in early September. The market began a roller coaster ride up until late October. A week before "Black Thursday", many highly respected bankers, like Charles Mitchell and Thomas Lamont of Morgan bank were saying how well the economy was and the only direction was up.
On Tuesday, October 24th, amidst rumors of economic uncertainty, the stock market lost 11% of it's value right at the opening bell. It continued to fall through the early afternoon. Some of the leading Wall Street bankers, like Thomas Lamont, Albert Wiggin, Charles E. Mitchell, and Richard Whitney, decided to pool some money together and buy large amounts of shares in Blue Chip stocks at higher than normal bids in order to demonstrate their faith in the market in hopes that it would curb the sell off as it did in 1907. There was a temporary respite and the market closed that day only down a little over 6.3% which was small compared to the direction it had been going earlier in the day.
The crash had been staved off, but as Newspapers began to write about the instability of the market and the prospect of Herbert Hoover refusing to veto the Smoot-Haley Tariff act, the general consensus was that there was no better time than the present to get out of the market. October 28th, termed "Black Monday", saw a drop in the market of nearly 13%. "Black Tuesday", October 29, close to 16 million shares were traded, and the Dow lost an additional 30 points (11.73%).
Banker William Durant thought that he could support the market with a steady stream of capital in the form of purchasing stocks, but it was not enough. The market continued to fall and hit a short term bottom of 198 points by mid November. It then had a rally, going up to 294 in early April of 1930, then once again began a long and steady decline which hit rock bottom in July, 1932 when the Dow closed at a little over $41.
Many economists of the times had been warning of the coming crash of the stock market, but were not taken seriously by Wall Street or investors who had been borrowing money on margin. Roger Babson had been forecasting a stock market crash for 2 years, yet he was dismissed as unpatriotic until September of 1929, the height of unrest over the market's dependence on borrowed money. Billions of dollars disappeared in a matter of days in October of 1929. The stock market crash, although not considered the direct cause of the "The Great Depression", was a broken rung on the ladder of American and global economic stability.
Regardless of one's stance of the reasons for the stock market crash of 1929 or the ensuing depression, one thing that is always true of these historical events is that the mass population is effected. Jobs are lost, savings are lost, homes are lost, families are lost, dreams are lost, and faith in the system is lost. The practice of speculation in the stock market was like a long wonderful party at which the booze flowed freely and the music never stopped. That is until the next morning when the bill had to be paid, the house had to be cleaned, and the hangover was in full effect. Like many parties that lasted too long, the police, or in this case the government, intervened too late. In 1933, they passed the Glass-Steagal act which created the FDIC and put limits on the behavior and expansion of Wall Street and banks to say the least. It was the beginning of a regulated and responsible form of Capitalism in America that had been needed since before the dawning of the 20th century. Pandora's box was finally closed...
So, as I said in my previous post, I have started to play more poker, mostly online, but I am finally concentrating on improving my NLHE game. I have been rereading Ed Miller's 1st No limit book and have been listening to some of Bart Hanson's old "Deuce Plays" podcasts. I've also been posting a lot more in the live low limit NLHE forums on 2+2. It's a nice feeling to be back in the swing of poker and surprisingly, I have not missed LHE as much as I thought I would. It is after all, my first love when it comes to poker, but given the landscape of the online poker scene at CAKE, there's just not a big enough player pool for me to build a bankroll, find good games and move up.
Oh, I forgot to mention, I am officially a winning player at NLHE in the .02-.04 stakes. I know that doesn't sound like a great feat, but for the year 2011, I would just mess around and play ultra LAGgy at NLHE which meant losing quite a bit. When I did start to play a bit more serious, I would not hand read that well and just donk off when faced with big turn raises. I am now focused on improving my game which helped quite a bit the last time I played live at my nearby casino. I had a bunch of fish at the table with one decent LAG. I got an old man to spew off a buy-in to me with K4s while chasing a flush draw. I hit a bunch of sets and had another player hand over a buy-in when I hit set over set. All in all, I was up 2 1/2 buy-ins which was a nice confidence booster.
I have also had some luck at the slots machine. In the past 3 months I have won close to $1,000 playing $10 slots which is always a nice addition. I know that you can't depend on winning lots of money at slots, but the lesson that I have been focusing on is not to view gambling money as real money which in turn, has helped me to not be so afraid, especially at the live poker tables. I am hoping this will help to concentrate on hand reading and picking good spots.
Some more good news is that I have booked a trip for 1 to Las Vegas in the mid fall. I have been rather worn down from the Summer with my 3 sons. Obviously I love my children more than anything, but it does get tiring to be the referee of a 5 year old and two 3 year olds. Let's just say that I have become sick to death of Star Wars. I am hoping that a little Las Vegas RnR will recharge my batteries. This time I am going alone. No boys club being rowdy and arguing. Just me, a cigar, some scotch, and the pokerz. I do plan on throwing in some rest by the pool with a Pina Colada time as well, but I am hoping to play a good amount of NLHE and see where my game is at.
As always, thank you for reading and any and all comments are welcome. Have a fun rest of your summer.
